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SUMMARY
w After the departure of the 
International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF), 
delivering development 
assistance in Afghanistan can 
return to common practices 
and procedures used in other 
insecure areas such as Somalia 
and Sudan (and already in areas 
of Afghanistan). This means 
that the international 
community must develop a 
civilian entry strategy and 
communicate to the Afghan 
population that civilian entry, 
not military exit, is its strategy 
for the future. 
Donors should ignore the 
current commitment to channel 
50 per cent of assistance 
through the central 
government budget. Instead, in 
each sector (e.g. health care, 
education, security) an 
effective division of labour 
must be established between 
the central and provincial 
governments, non-
governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and the private sector. 
Involving NGOs, the private 
sector and the local population 
in the delivery of basic services 
does not have to be at the 
expense of government control 
or legitimacy. 
International aid donors 
need to pay further attention to 
security and rule of law. But 
alternatives to the current 
strategy, which is often 
perceived as being militarized 
and short-term, have to be 
found. It is often more effective 
to integrate these issues into 
broader development 
programmes.
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I. Introduction
With the closure of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and 
the withdrawal of most North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces 
scheduled for the end of 2014, international assistance for Afghanistan is 
entering a new era. Many donors have become accustomed to the presence of 
ISAF’s military infrastructure and provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) 
and to providing assistance in a highly militarized environment. Those 
donors now face a number of strategic questions and dilemmas regarding the 
provision of development assistance after 2014. Even though a residual inter-
national military presence will remain, donors are considering how they can 
continue to provide development assistance and perhaps use it to increase 
assistance to the Afghan Government in the provision of security and rule of 
law while operating in the absence of the current military infrastructures, 
in a potentially deteriorating security environment, and with a government 
that still has insufficient capacity and faces rampant corruption. 
This paper considers the following three questions. 
1. After the departure of ISAF, and in a potentially more insecure environ-
ment, how can donors continue to provide development assistance?
2. Through which channels is the post-2014 development assistance best 
distributed?
3. In absence of the security and military tools previously used to provide 
assistance to security and rule of law in Afghanistan, how can such assis-
tance continue through development assistance instruments?
These questions are addressed in turn in sections II–IV. Section V presents 
conclusions and a number of recommendations on how donors can formu-
late—and promote—elements of a civilian entry strategy to parallel and 
replace the military exit strategy. The paper is intended  to contribute to the 
discussion on the way forward for aid donors.
* The research for this paper was commissioned by Cordaid. SIPRI and the author are 
grateful to Cordaid for its generous funding of this work.
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The ﬁndings of this paper result primarily from ﬁeld research undertaken, 
in collaboration with Cordaid, in May 2013 in Afghanistan that focused on 
the provinces of Balkh and Kandahar and on Kabul. Balkh and Kandahar 
were chosen since they can be considered representative of, respectively, 
the north and south of Afghanistan. The ﬁndings are based on interviews 
and focus group meetings with Afghan Government officials, analysts and 
researchers, representatives of domestic non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and civil society, farmers’ and women’s groups, as well as repre-
sentatives of international organizations, NGOs and donors.1
II. Provision of development assistance after 2014
In both Balkh and Kandahar provinces there was some optimism among 
Afghan interviewees about the security situation after ISAF withdraws in 
2014. They noted that many PRTs have already left, that most assistance 
channelled through PRTs has ended and that much of the development 
assistance avoided cooperation with the PRTs in the ﬁrst place. Nonetheless, 
in Balkh, according to Afghan interviewees, continuous references to ‘2014’ 
have provoked anxiety of what may be coming. This response was even 
described by some of them as a ‘psychosocial trauma’. In Kandahar there 
appeared to be two views on post-2014 Afghanistan: with 
ISAF leaving and international troops primarily conﬁned 
to their bases, either (a) violence will decrease as there is no 
longer a reason to ﬁght the foreign troops; or (b) violence will 
increase since the capacity of the Afghan national security forces (ANSF) 
will be insufficient to deal with armed groups. In Kabul pessimism appeared 
to dominate as interviewees predicted that security will decrease, particu-
larly in certain provinces.
In all three regions there was a fear that criminal violence will increase. 
The development workers interviewed regarded the effects of criminal 
violence to be more detrimental for the provision of assistance than military 
or political violence, as criminal violence is more indiscriminate. It was also 
generally argued by interviewees that some people will have to ﬁnd alterna-
tive—illegal—sources of income as a result of economic decline, increased 
unemployment and, particularly in southern Afghanistan, the decrease in 
services required by the international military presence. 
1  The research involved 38 interviews and 4 focus group meetings. Interviews took place in both 
Mazar i Sharif (capital of Balkh) and Kabul. For security reasons, interviewees from Kandahar were 
contacted by telephone and 4 ﬂew to Kabul for a focus group meeting. Cordaid and its partners 
selected the interviewees and focus group participants in close cooperation with the author, giving 
particular attention to diversity. The author also selected a number of additional interviewees.
The Afghan interviewees were of mixed ethnic origin. Those from the south were predominantly 
Pashtun, while a majority of those from the north were non-Pashtun. To balance the otherwise urban 
selection of interviewees, 2 of the focus groups in Mazar i Sharif were held with representatives of 
farmer cooperatives. 
Although the gender balance was poor, particular attention was given to ensure input from 
women. This was done in Mazar i Sharif through a women’s focus group and in Mazar i Sharif and 
Kabul through interviews with women. No women from the south were interviewed. 
The initial ﬁndings were discussed at a meeting with representatives of different donors in Kabul. 
There is some optimism about the 
security situation after ISAF withdraws
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Security after 2014
As the future of Afghan security is unpredictable and as the United Nations 
reports a sharp increase in attacks on civilians and aid workers, donors 
should be prepared for the possibility that the security situation will 
deterior ate.2 Thus, many donor governments are looking for practical solu-
tions to continue providing development assistance without a PRT or other 
NATO military presence in most provinces. Donor governments have been 
able to rely on the ISAF military infrastructure for travel, 
for housing, for medical evacuation, for security (including 
evacuation) and for monitoring of projects. In addition, a 
limited number of larger development organizations have 
depended on this military infrastructure for their security 
protocols for emergency situations. 
In interviews some donors therefore viewed the continuing presence of 
foreign military bases in Mazar i Sharif (capital of Balkh), Kabul and Kan-
dahar  (capital of Kandahar province) as essential to their operations. After 
2014, these bases would form part of a ‘hub and spoke’ model, with Kabul as 
the hub and a limited number of foreign military bases around the country 
being the spokes. A number of other donor officials regarded lower-proﬁle 
solutions as having the potential to offer more security, such as a network of 
civilian-run safe houses that could be shared with NGOs. Moreover, there 
would also be civilian alternatives for medical evacuation and emergency 
security protocols.
By far the majority of NGO interviewees did not see the end of the PRT 
infrastructure as problematic for the provision of development assistance. 
They cited their presence in Afghanistan for up to 30 years (including 
during the period of Taliban rule) as evidence that they do not need the 
Afghan Government or PRTs to do their work. Furthermore, the NGO inter-
viewees argued that the NGOs have barely used the PRTs, and even ensured 
strict separation of their activities from those of the PRTs. However, these 
interviewees often neglected the fact that current development assistance 
is different from much of the humanitarian assistance given in the past: it 
is much easier to hand out humanitarian assistance than to build a school 
which then has to be integrated in a national programme, needs long-term 
funding, depends on local staff and so on. 
NGO representatives underlined that PRT infrastructure has not been 
needed for delivering development assistance in other conﬂict-affected 
countries, such as Somalia or Sudan. Moreover, the aid recipients inter-
viewed from both Balkh and Kandahar either thought that they have not 
beneﬁted greatly from PRT projects or perceived them as being ineffective 
and short-term. Indeed, only a small portion of donor funds have been spent 
through the PRTs. Estimates on the exact percentage of official development 
2  United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Humanitarian 
Bulletin: Afghanistan, no. 19 (1–30 Aug. 2013); and United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
(UNAMA), Afghanistan Mid-year Report 2013: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conﬂict (UNAMA: 
Kabul, July 2013).
PRT infrastructure has not been needed 
for delivering development assistance in 
other conﬂict-affected countries
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assistance (ODA) channelled through the PRTs vary widely, but generally 
range between 5 and 10 per cent.3
According to the interviewees, NGOs and to a lesser extent international 
organizations and the Afghan Government can still provide assistance in 
less secure areas. Insecurity would not be constantly high, as there are many 
lulls in the ﬁghting. NGO representatives argued that they may sometimes 
need to interrupt, but not cease, assistance. While delivery of aid would be 
virtually impossible only in areas controlled by what they called the ‘Paki-
stani Taliban’ (i.e. elements of the Taliban believed to originate in Pakistan), 
in contested areas and areas controlled by what they called the ‘Afghan 
Taliban’, delivery of assistance would remain possible with the help of local 
communities.  NGOs and aid recipients in Balkh and Kandahar tend to over-
look the fact that a secure airstrip is essential for service delivery: if security 
deteriorates after 2014, airstrips may no longer be secure. Thus, they may 
need to temper their expectations of being able to manage the difficulties of a 
new, potentially less secure environment.
Whatever the future scenario, much depends on the kinds of development 
project undertaken. According to the development workers interviewed, 
projects for establishing girls’ schools or building roads (which open regions 
up to government or international forces) generally meet with more resist-
ance than projects such as water-provision projects that are usually wanted 
by local populations. Contentious projects, which are primarily located in 
southern Afghanistan, may, according to NGO interviewees, have to rely 
exclusively on local staff and would require trust and, ideally, a long-standing 
established relationship with the local communities.
3  See e.g. Poole, L., Afghanistan: Tracking Major Resource Flows 2002–2010 (Development 
Initiatives: Wells, Jan. 2011), p. 11.
Box 1. Examples of alternative ways of monitoring aid projects
Third-party monitoring
Hire local researchers or non-governmental organizations, the government and international organizations.
Community-based monitoring
Use local communities, village elders or the aid recipients.
Complaint boxes
Use, for example, a local representative or phone number as a way for recipients of assistance to ﬁle complaints about projects.
Cameras 
Collect video and photographic evidence.
Aerial photography
Use satellite imagery or airplanes.
Social media
Use social media.
Sources: Author interviews. See also Stoddard, A., Harmer, A. and Renouf, J. S., Once Removed: Lessons and Challenges in Remote 
Management of Humanitarian Operations for Insecure Areas (Humanitarian Outcomes: London, 25 Feb. 2010).
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Monitoring and evaluating aid projects
Although operational monitoring of ongoing projects and evaluation of 
closed projects may face obstacles if, for example, non-Afghan staff are no 
longer able to visit projects or if ﬁeld offices are closed, neither donor nor 
NGO representatives saw these problems as insurmount-
able. They pointed at the option of ‘remote control’ project 
implementation—that is, project implementation by local 
staff, with non-local NGO staff remaining outside the 
implementation area—which is a common practice in inse-
cure areas. 
However, while experience from countries such as Afghanistan, Somalia 
and Sudan shows that—due to the need for greater adaptability and risk man-
agement—projects in conﬂict-affected areas actually require more, not less, 
attention, many donors have relaxed reporting and oversight in monitoring 
and evaluation of such projects.4 Despite the obstacles to monitoring and 
evaluation, however, one of the best strategies in fragile and conﬂict-affected 
states is to ensure that the data on project implemen tation is robust enough 
by combining complementary monitoring processes to enable triangulation.5
When looking at different methods of operational monitoring, inter viewees 
generally thought that, for example, the Kabul embassies of donor states 
would still be able to undertake missions to the regions of Afghanistan, but 
that they will have less access to information and will become more depend-
ent on other sources, such as NGOs. According to interviewees, alternative 
methods of operational monitoring that have been developed in Afghanistan 
and other conﬂict-affected areas where traditional means of monitoring 
and evaluation are not possible may also be needed (see box 1). Moreover, 
they argued, with the aim of strengthening the capacity of the state, the role 
of the Afghan Government in monitoring projects should also increase. In 
addition, they advised increased use of social media for aid monitoring.
Although compromises may have to be made, a ‘good-enough’ (i.e. ade-
quate, albeit not high) level of evaluation is possible. For this purpose, trust 
in and a long-standing relationship with established implementing partner 
organizations will be important. Nonetheless, the more difficult the area, 
the more likely donors will have to accept a certain level of corruption as an 
‘operational’ cost. 
Business as usual after 2014
In short, interviewees generally felt that, with the departure of the bulk of the 
international forces, the extraordinary situation that has existed since 2001 
will come to an end and development assistance in Afghanistan will go back 
to ‘business as usual’: returning to the common practices and procedures 
typically used in insecure areas, just as in other conﬂict-affected countries. 
However, they stressed that in the new situation donors, NGOs, the private 
sector (ranging from business to farming) and the Afghan Government will 
4  Cox, M. and Thornton, N., ‘Managing results in conﬂict-affected and fragile states: a stock-take 
of lessons, experience and practice’, Agulhas, May 2010, <http://www.agulhas.co.uk/Publications_
Fragile_States.html>.
5  Cox and Thornton (note 4).
Although compromises may have to be 
made, a ‘good-enough’ level of evaluation 
is possible
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become increasingly dependent on each other for, among other things, the 
exchange of information and lessons learned and should therefore increase 
their cooperation.
III. Distribution channels for development assistance
At the July 2012 Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan, many donors pledged 
assistance to Afghanistan for the post-2014 period. While some donors kept 
their levels of assistance comparable to previous years, a number decreased 
their assistance or have not yet made a decision (see table 1). Moreover, most 
donors that pledged assistance did so only until 2016 or 2017. This is in line 
with World Bank estimates that assistance to Afghanistan will decline, caus-
ing ﬁnancial pressure during the transition.6
In Tokyo the international community also made a commitment to align 
80 per cent of development assistance with the Afghan Government’s 
6  World Bank, Afghanistan in Transition: Looking beyond 2014 (World Bank: Washington, DC, 
May 2012).
Table 1. International aid disbursements to Afghanistan, 2009–11 and 2015
Figures are US$ m.
Rank Donor
Disbursed Pledged 
2015a
Details of 2011 disbursementsb
Directly on 
budget
Via on-budget 
trust funds Off budget
Share on 
budget (%)2009 2010 2011
1 United States 3 382 8 126 10 406 . . 674 468 9 264 11
2 Japan 615 752 670 600 70 240 360 46
3 United Kingdom 310 383 357 265 6 158 194 46
4 European Union 322 264 221 . . – 60 161 27
5 Germany 140 205 216 552 – 77 139 36
6 ADB 108 290 123 240 123 – – 100
7 World Bank 174 192 152 . . 152 – – 100
8 Canada 201 78 116 54 – 32 84 28
9 Netherlands 184 91 95 . . – 55 40 58
10 Australia 130 36 150 227 90 – 60 60
11 Sweden 94 100 101 120 – 29 72 29
12 Denmark 70 70 65 91 20 14 30 53
13 Norway 125 – 77 125 – 21 56 27
14 India 93 77 0 125 – – – –
15 Italy 65 37 50 . . 12 10 28 44
16 France 33 38 25 38 2 – 23 8
17 UAE 4 56 35 . . – – 35 –
18 Finland 25 27 17 39 1 11 6 67
ADB = Asian Development Bank; UAE = United Arab Emirates.
a These ﬁgures are based on pledges made at the July 2012 Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan. In the case of multi-year pledges, 
the annual average has been taken. Exchange rates of July 2013 have been used where necessary. 
b On-budget disbursement refers to aid that is given directly to the central Afghan Government and which is reported in the 
national budget. Aid disbursed via trust funds but which appear on the government budget is also considered as being on budget. 
Off-budget disbursement refers to aid that does not pass through the central government budget.
Source: Afghan Ministry of Finance (MOF), Development Cooperation Report 2012 (MOF: Kabul, 2012), pp. 50, 53, 61–62.
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National Priority Programmes and to channel at least 50 per cent of develop-
ment assistance through the national budget of the Afghan Government.7 
Although donors hope in this way to increase the capacity and, consequently, 
the legitimacy of the Afghan Government as part of their state-building 
strategy, they are simultaneously looking for alternative channels for their 
assistance in order to avoid three main problems: (a) the limited capacity 
of the government to manage and monitor assistance; (b) the corruption in 
the government; and (c) the limited capacity of the government to imple-
ment projects in contested areas.8 As a consequence, few donors have met 
the commitment to provide 50 per cent of their assistance on-budget (see 
table 1).
The role of the central government
This dilemma between state-building and aid effectiveness was also recog-
nized among Afghan interviewees. It is remarkable that in a divided country 
like Afghanistan, all interviewees from Balkh, Kabul and Kandahar saw 
having a strong government with a large role for the central government as 
a goal. However, they saw major government-related obstacles for progress 
to development, including the government’s high corrup-
tion rates, its low capacity to channel funds to projects, its 
paper-heavy bureaucratic procedures, its low implemen-
tation capacity in many sectors, especially at the provincial 
level, and its being a target in insecure areas. However, 
many NGO representatives admit that neither NGOs nor 
international organizations are perfect: they would also have high rates of 
leakage of funds to consultants and overheads, and there would also be cor-
ruption among NGOs.
As noted above, all interviewees stressed the importance of central gov-
ernment. Interviewees suggested that the central government should make 
policy and regulations. Moreover, it should be an important link in the ﬁnan-
cial chain, as interviewees generally believed that funding should largely be 
channelled through the centre. They clearly preferred a system of decen-
tralized implementation of national policy, but did not consider any form of 
federalization acceptable. For example, they generally rejected funnelling 
funds directly to provincial governments in order to reduce corruption and 
bureaucracy and to ensure a direct relationship between donors and their 
recipients; as it was believed that directly ﬁnancing provinces would create 
chaos. Indeed, levels of corruption in the provinces were argued to be just as 
high as in the central government, only on a smaller scale, and interviewees 
argued that ministers can be held accountable to parliament while provin-
cial governors are only accountable to the president. 
7  Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan, ‘The Tokyo Declaration: partnership for self-reliance in 
Afghanistan, from transition to transformation’, Tokyo, 8 July 2012.
8  World Bank, Afghanistan in Transition: Looking beyond 2014 (World Bank: Washington, DC, 
May 2012); Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), Quarterly Report 
to the United States Congress (SIGAR: Arlington, VA, 30 Jan. 2013); and Special Inspector General 
for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), Quarterly Report to the United States Congress (SIGAR: 
Arlington, VA, 30 Apr. 2013).
All interviewees saw having a strong 
government with a large role for the 
central government as a goal
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Although the execution of planned spending by line ministries of the cen-
tral government is sometimes low, their spending capacity would, according 
to interviewees, still be much larger than that of the provinces. Moreover, 
provincial spending would be just as constrained as central spending since 
many of the capacity constraints result from the many different and compli-
cated donor procurement regulations.
There appeared to be a common understanding among the interviewees 
from government, NGOs and the private sector that they need to better 
cooperate and work together. Many argued that the government and NGOs 
depend on each other: the government would be unable to deliver many ser-
vices without NGOs, and NGOs that deliver services need the government 
in order to operate. Moreover, NGOs also aim to strengthen and support the 
state, and often believe that the government should have more control over 
the ﬁnancing and the provision of basic services. 
Balancing the roles of government and NGOs 
Interviewees argued that the government and NGOs often ﬁnd themselves 
in a competitive state of mind, partly because they sometimes appear to 
compete for the same funds. While the government wants to increase its 
control over spending on basic service delivery, NGOs want to retain funding 
for the implementation of their activities. While both sides appear to see the 
relation ship as a zero-sum game, their aims are not necessarily contradic-
tory. Yet the discussion at the international level on the shares of aid that 
should be on- and off-budget reinforces the perspective of competition, 
because in that discussion funding and implementation are often equated: 
the view is that services delivered by the government would stimulate state-
building, while those delivered by other organizations would not. 
According to most interviewees in Afghanistan, it would be more pro-
ductive to ignore the speciﬁc percentage ﬁgures for on- and off-budget aid 
(although on-budget aid should increase when possible) and look instead at 
what is practically needed on the ground. Interviewees often gave health 
care and education as examples of sectors where a division of tasks between 
different types of actor—the central government, provincial governments, 
NGOs and the private sector—on the basis of what is needed to provide 
basic services has worked reasonably well, although certainly not perfectly. 
In basic health care, for example, the government is in control of contracts 
and regulation, but almost all implementation is done by NGOs. In this 
Table 2. Examples of division of tasks by sector
The following examples should be seen as illustrative rather than prescriptive.
Sector
Policymaking/ 
regulation Planning Implementation
Monitoring and 
evaluation
Agriculture Central government Private sector Private sector Private sector
Education Central government Provincial government Provincial government Central government
Health care Central government Provincial government NGOs Provincial government
Security Central government Central government Central government Central government
NGO = Non-governmental organization.
Sources: Author interviews.
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win–win situation, the government is in control but NGOs are still able to 
work. 
The Afghan interviewees from both the government and civil society 
argued that, for each sector and region, the Afghan Government (after suit-
able consultation) should decide which tasks are best done by the govern-
ment and which task would better be undertaken by others. Interviewees 
generally believed that in some sectors, such as security, the government 
should undertake the complete range of tasks, from regulation (i.e. prom-
ulgation of law and setting policy) and planning to implementation, and 
then to monitoring and evaluation (with NGOs limited to advocacy and a 
role in monitoring and evaluation). In other cases, parts of the chain (e.g. 
implementation in the case of health care) would be better handled by NGOs 
and the private sector, while central and provincial governments should play 
a strong role in, for example, monitoring. In all cases, service delivery should 
be in close cooperation and consultation with local communities. 
Interviewees often argued that a division of labour, similar to that used 
in Western countries, is already more or less formalized in the Afghan basic 
health care sector (although not yet perfected due to pro-
vincial authorities’ lack of monitoring capacity). Similarly, 
they argued that focusing only on increasing funding to the 
government would not be effective because in some regions 
the government would not yet be able to undertake some of the tasks that, 
ideally, it should do. For example, the government may not have the capacity 
for such tasks or it might be too dangerous for the government to go into 
certain regions, while NGOs would not be targeted. Thus, for the moment, 
therefore, these tasks still have to be done by others. According to interview-
ees, in such regions the long-term aim should be to move tasks from NGOs 
to the state, but this should be done slowly in order for government capacity 
to grow. 
In short, interviewees generally felt that more creativity is needed in ﬁnd-
ing practical solutions. According to them, there are many ways in which 
tasks can be allocated for different sectors (see table 2 for one example). In 
fact, in some sectors or regions several actors would be expected to be jointly 
responsible for the same task.
Earmarking and conditionality: from percentages to practical 
solutions
In conclusion, most interviewees, from Balkh, Kabul and Kandahar, advised 
donors to distribute most funds centrally but to stimulate creativity in 
implementation by earmarking funds and by attaching conditions. Thus, 
funds can be earmarked for certain provinces to ensure that the central 
government does not take an undue share and that corruption is minimized; 
and conditionality can ensure that certain tasks—be it regulating, planning, 
implementing, monitoring or evaluating—involve civil society and other 
organizations. 
According to interviewees, such an approach would place the Afghan state 
at the heart of the process; it would make the discussion on shares of aid 
provided on or off budget irrelevant, while allowing more creative and effec-
tive solutions concerning who implements which task in which sector. If the 
NGOs also aim to strengthen and support 
the state
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Afghan state’s security and capacity improve, then its role would increase 
and NGOs would move from implementation to monitoring and advocacy. If 
security deteriorates, then the role of NGOs in implementation might have to 
increase, according to interviewees, preferably in close cooperation with the 
government.
IV. Continuing support to security and rule of law through 
development assistance
Many of the Afghan interviewees assessed much of the international 
assistance so far as unsuccessful. They offered two main arguments. First, 
most funds have been spent on the international forces, not on development. 
Second, too much development assistance has been spent on short-term 
projects and not on infrastructure—such as factories, dams and irrigation 
works—which interviewees termed the ‘fundamentals’ of development.
Priorities for international funding
When asked for their priorities for international funding, interviewees from 
Balkh, Kabul and Kandahar consistently identiﬁed agriculture, education 
and health care as their top three (although with some variety in their order). 
They chose agriculture as it is by far the largest sector. About 60 per cent 
of the working population is involved in this sector, and during the period 
2003/04–2010/11 it accounted for between a quarter and a third of Afghani-
stan’s gross domestic product.9 Education was seen by 
interviewees as essential for long-term development, while 
health care was regarded as an important need. Moreover, 
these two sectors would give public presence and legitimacy 
to the government. 
In general, Afghan interviewees saw economic development as the best 
and most sustainable path to security. They often argued that the absence 
of jobs leads to insecurity. However, there appears to be no such correlation: 
the most insecure provinces are not the poorest, while some of the poorest 
provinces are remarkably secure.10
Surveys by the Asia Foundation have found that Afghans perceive 
insecurity as the biggest problem for their country.11 At the same time, 
they perceive unemployment to be the biggest problem at the local level.12 
When asked about the importance of projects and programmes related to 
security and rule of law, interviewees referred to these issues as ‘also very 
important’, but less important than addressing the top three sectors. There 
are two possible explanations for the lower importance attached to address-
ing security and rule of law: either their absence has become ‘background 
noise’ and interviewees no longer recognize it, or they do not realize the 
9  World Bank (note 8), p. 25.
10  Afghan Ministry of Economy, Poverty Status in Afghanistan: A Proﬁle Based on National Risk 
and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) 2007/08 (World Bank: Washington, DC, July 2010), pp. 26–29.
11  Hopkins, N. (ed.), Afghanistan in 2012: A Survey of the Afghan People (Asia Foundation: Kabul, 
2012), p. 29.
12  Hopkins (note 11), p. 31.
Afghan interviewees saw economic 
development as the best and most 
sustainable path to security
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importance of both issues because they have never lived in a country where 
they could experience them. It is also possible that most interviewees think 
that insecur ity is best addressed through development, or that they regard 
current approaches to law and security as less relevant than development. 
Whatever the explanation, it is important to note these Afghan priorities. 
Policy instruments to address insecurity
Interviewees described the policy instruments required to address insecur-
ity in military terms. In Balkh, interviewees focused on external security, 
as they want ﬁnancial and materiel support to the Afghan National Army 
to resist Pakistan in the south and to a lesser extent Iran in the west. Inter-
viewees from Kandahar focused on internal security. They saw ﬁnancial 
support to the ANSF as important to facilitate the payment 
of salaries to ANSF personnel and, after their inte gration 
into the ANSF, the personnel of other armed groups, 
ranging from reconciled opposition forces to militias that 
have supported the international forces. In add ition, inter-
viewees from Kandahar believed that training by international forces would 
still be required after 2014, although these international forces should be 
conﬁned to their bases. They also believed that the ANSF could still require 
backup from international forces. In Kabul, interviewees’ focus combined 
both external and internal security needs.
Interviewees regarded assistance to the security sector as important, but 
the current international strategy was generally criticized. They argued that 
it is too focused on ﬁghting insurgents, rather than creating and maintain-
ing an effective infrastructure for the rule of law. Short-term training would 
be suboptimal and much more attention should be given to establishing 
long-term capacity building. This would mean, among other things, much 
more support for the Afghan National Police Academy, the Afghan National 
Security University and the faculties of law of Afghan universities to edu-
cate future generations of police and military officers, judges, lawyers and 
prosecutors, among others. In addition, according to interviewees, prevent-
ing violations of law requires more attention. Finally, since corruption is 
currently perceived as one of the biggest problems in the legal and judicial 
system, increasing salaries was regarded as an important tool to decrease 
the pressure to be corrupt.
Separate programmes in the ﬁeld of rule of law were generally perceived 
by interviewees as not being effective and often being implemented by 
organizations—typically NGOs—that are primarily acting for their own ben-
eﬁt. Moreover, according to interviewees the issue of rule of law is perceived 
by the population to be part of a Western agenda; to counter this, rule of law 
education for the local population should be adapted to the local context, for 
example, by using phrases and concepts from the Quran and Hadiths. 
Interviewees generally argued that both security and rule of law should 
be integrated into broader development assistance programmes. Rule of law, 
for example, could be part of educational projects, while members of farmer 
cooperatives in Balkh argued that their cooperatives have helped to create 
more harmony between the different ethnic groups (Uzbeks, Tajik and Pash-
tun) in their villages.
Security and rule of law should be 
integrated into broader development 
assistance programmes
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Particularly in Balkh province, NGOs interviewees imagined that in the 
future they would move away from service delivery in the ﬁeld of rule of law 
and security to an advocacy role. According to NGO and government repre-
sentatives, civil society could also play a role in building the capacity of the 
government, awareness building and monitoring.
V. Conclusions and recommendations: a civilian entry 
strategy
The drawdown of ISAF may be a blessing in disguise. It appears that many 
of the problems in Afghanistan are common to other insecure areas, such as 
Somalia and Sudan. This means that after 2014 development assistance in 
Afghanistan will in many ways have to return to common practice typical in 
such insecure areas, with international donor governments delivering their 
services without the protection of foreign troops. With the withdrawal of 
these foreign troops, this may be the right moment to replace the present 
military exit strategy with a civilian entry strategy (including in the ﬁeld of 
security and rule of law).
It is widely argued that the current focus on the military exit in 2014 will 
strengthen the insurgency as the exit decreases faith in the Afghan Govern-
ment’s capacity, increases uncertainty and gives hope to 
insurgents. Rather than a pessimistic military exit strategy, 
a positive civilian entry strategy could be communicated to 
the Afghan population. Such a civilian entry strategy would 
work towards more sustainable development, in which the 
current gains are maintained and built upon. In other words, 
communicating that Afghanistan will not face the end of an 
era, but stands at the beginning of a new civilian transformation era, could 
counter current anxiety about 2014. 
As part of a civilian entry strategy, keeping aid levels at levels of previous 
years would be helpful, instead of the expected decrease in assistance. For 
such a civilian entry strategy to succeed, aid donors would have to rely heav-
ily on local partners to implement projects and would have to avoid funds 
being diverted to insurgents. Moreover, the approach would have to depend 
on the Afghan absorption capacity
Based on the above ﬁndings, international aid donors may consider the 
following elements of such a civilian entry strategy.
1. Donors should recognize that development assistance can be provided 
in more insecure areas without military infrastructure such as the PRTs. 
Examples on how to organize this, for example in monitoring and evalua-
tion, may be taken from countries such as Somalia and Sudan, and existing 
NGO practice already in place in areas of Afghanistan.
2. Together with the Afghan Government, NGOs, the private sector and 
beneﬁciary communities, donors could establish more regular exchanges of 
information and lessons learned. All these groups might want to improve 
their cooperation, since they increasingly depend on each other for their 
individual and common success.
Rather than a pessimistic military exit 
strategy, a positive civilian entry strategy 
could be communicated to the Afghan 
population
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3.  Donors should channel funding through the central government, but 
could earmark funds for certain provinces and impose conditions to ensure 
the involvement of civil society and the private sector.
4. Donors could coordinate among themselves their regulations and pro-
cedures for the Afghan Government to make them more homogeneous and 
less complicated and to make the associated procedures less paper heavy.
5. Together with the Afghan Government and population, donors should 
assess which organization is best equipped for each tasks in each sector—
including regulating, planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating—
rather than following the rigid formula of providing at least 50 per cent of aid 
on the central government budget. Practical solutions could be sought in the 
division of these tasks.
6.  Donors should assist in increasing common understanding between 
NGOs and the Afghan Government, for example, by seconding Afghan civil 
servants to NGOs and through common training courses.
7. Rather than organizing separate programmes for rule of law and security, 
donors should integrate these issues into broader development programmes 
and make them more acceptable by, for example, using phrases and concepts 
from the Quran and Hadiths.
8. Donors should focus on improving long-term infrastructure for rule of 
law and security, not on short-term training.
9.  Donors should communicate and put into practice a civilian entry in 
Afghanistan, rather than a military exit.
In order to make this credible, many donors need to further increase their 
aid pledges to match previous levels of assistance and they need to show a 
longer commitment to Afghanistan than 2016 or 2017.
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Abbreviations
ANSF Afghan national security forces
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO Non-governmental organization
PRT Provincial reconstruction team
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